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Abstract 
 
Imports are increasingly becoming a significant source of Japan’s pork supply. 
Japan’s share of imports to total consumption increased from 9 percent in 1980 to 24 
percent in 1990, reaching a maximum of 44 percent in 1996. 
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) safeguard provisions for pork, Japan 
can raise its gate price by 24 percent when imports in a given quarter are 119 percent 
higher than the average imports of the last three years of the same quarter. Japan has 
already invoked the safeguard provision twice since the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA) was signed in 1995. In both cases, the level and volatility of retail 
prices increased; the CIF values of imports increased, making the impact on the 
government of Japan (GOJ) tax revenue uncertain; the level of imports and stocks 
increased; and the timing of imports changed. 
New underlying parameter estimates suggest that the reduction in pork exporters’ 
profit is three times higher when the Japanese General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) safeguard is invoked, providing foreign pork suppliers an incentive to collude to 
avoid exceeding the trigger. Workable and efficient allocation rules are constructed with a 
multi-plant monopolist structure that allows trade of quota. This collusion is welfare-
improving since the safeguard induces more inefficiencies, including larger deadweight 
loss and a shift from low cost to high cost pork supply. 
 
Key Words: Collusion, international agricultural trade, policy analysis, welfare. 
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Pork claims the largest and most stable share in Japan’s per capita total meat 
consumption at 40 percent, but Japan’s swine-pork sector has contracted since 1990 at 2.5 
percent each year. As a result, the share of imports to total consumption increased 
significantly from a mere 9 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 1990, reaching a maximum 
of 44 percent in 1996. Also, Japan’s pork imports are the largest in the world, 
representing 38.31 percent of total world pork imports. 
Japan’s core policy objectives include ensuring food security, stabilizing prices, and 
maintaining a rural living standard that is comparable to that of urban areas. The specific 
instrument to implement government policies in the beef and pork sector uses a price 
stabilization band. The mid-point price of the band is set to meet the objective of 
maintaining a standard of living in rural areas, while the floor and ceiling prices are set to 
constrain excess upward price movements.  
A farm-to-wholesale-price transmission function with a transmission elasticity and 
distribution of the error structure (i.e., k → N(µk, σk)) is key in determining the price 
band. The midpoint of the price band is determined using an average of the farm price 
adjusted by an index of the annual cost of finishing slaughter-ready swine, and translated 
into the wholesale price using the price transmission elasticity. The floor price is derived 
from the midpoint price by subtracting one standard deviation of the regression error 
estimate. Adding one standard deviation of the regression error estimate to the midpoint 
price derives the ceiling price. The Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC) 
intervenes in the market through its purchase (or storage subsidies granted to producers) 
and selling activities to ensure that market price always moves within the limits of the 
band. Moreover, the price band is supported at the border by requiring that all imports 
enter at a minimum import price, called the gate price, which is linked directly to the 
midpoint of the price stabilization band. Before the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
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Trade (GATT), a variable levy was used to implement the gate price policy. Imports with 
CIF values above the gate price were charged an ad valorem tax of 5 percent. 
The GATT rules have radically altered Japan’s import policies. Although the gate 
price was maintained, it is effectively decoupled from the stabilization price band and is 
subject to reduction commitments until 2000. The variable levy has been converted into a 
specific tax, and together with the ad valorem duty, is also subject to reduction 
commitments (see Table 1). The implementation of the specific tax (ST) stipulates that 
specific taxes that make the import price (CIF and duties included) more than the 
standard import price (SP, i.e., gate price with ad valorem duties applied) are exempt. 
Figure 1 (line abcd [kink bold line]) represents the relationship of the CIF and import 
price in this new policy regime. Pork imports with CIF prices in the a to b range are 
applied the full specific tax, while an increasing portion of the specific tax is exempt for 
pork imports with CIF prices in the range b to c. Only an ad valorem tax is imposed for 
pork imports with CIF prices beyond point c. 
The more compelling impact of GATT is on the safeguard provisions intended to 
protect importers from excess surges in imports. For Japan, when the cumulative sum of 
pork imports at the end of each quarter exceeds their average of the last three years by 
119 percent, the safeguard (SG) can be invoked where the gate price is raised by 24 
percent. The SG is in effect for the rest of Japan’s fiscal year (ending March 31). The 
dotted bold line in Figure 1 shows that the SG is equivalent to increasing the specific tax 
by raising the minimum CIF price when specific tax is exempt, reducing the exemption 
level, and increasing the maximum CIF price that is subject to the specific tax. Also, a 
special safeguard provision (SSG) granted in Section 4 of Article VI of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, provides that when the annual sum of pork imports at the end of the year 
exceeds 105 percent of their average level in the last three years, Japan can impose an 
additional duty, not to exceed one-third of the ordinary customs duty. Also, when the SG 
is in effect in the year when SSG is invoked, the SG is extended to the first quarter of the 
next fiscal year. Since implementation of the WTO agreement, Japan has invoked the SG 
provision only twice and the SSG once. 
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Taiwan, Denmark, the United States, and Canada have dominated Japan’s pork 
import market. Taiwan’s share in the fresh-chilled and frozen market of 47 percent and 37 
percent dropped to zero and to 2.15 percent, respectively, after foot-and-mouth disease 
(FMD) was confirmed by the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) in the early 1997. 
The United States captured Taiwan’s share in the fresh-chilled market, with its share 
increasing from 46 percent in 1996 to 75 percent in 1997. Canada follows the United 
States with its share increasing from 4.66 to 14 percent. The share of all other countries 
(e.g., South Korea, Mexico, and others) also increased from 2.75 to 10.62 percent. On the 
other hand, Denmark captured Taiwan’s share in the frozen market category with its share 
increasing from 24.13 to 32.38 percent. The share of Other Countries also increased from 
17.30 to 32.38 percent. 
This paper first determines whether foreign suppliers have an incentive to collude to 
restrict their level of exports in order to avoid triggering the safeguard, and whether such 
collusion is welfare-improving. Second, we construct rules of sharing out the market, 
under the collusion scenario that are both workable and efficient. To address these 
general objectives, the paper examines four specific goals:  
(1) to provide a detailed description of the trade policies affecting pork imports in 
Japan;  
 
(2) to analyze the impacts of the GATT safeguards;  
 
(3) to provide new supply and demand elasticity estimates from highly 
disaggregated and more recent monthly data; and  
 
(4) to quantify the incentive to collude. 
 
Model 
Consider a partial equilibrium model that includes a demand function [1a], domestic 
supply function [1b], supply function of foreign suppliers [1c], and policy function [1d], 
i.e., 
)|,,( dddZpD Φψ , (1a) 
)|,,( sssZpS Φψ , (1b) 
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),|,,,( ΘΦwswswsww ZppS ψ , and  (1c) 
),|( SDS wΘ . (1d) 
The arguments in the functions are domestic and world price p, vector of other arguments 
Z, random errors ψ, vector of parameters Φ, and policy parameter Θ. The subscripts are 
demand (d), and supply (s), and superscript is world (w). What is distinct in this model is 
that it allows foreign suppliers to influence domestic policy parameters, which then 
affects their decision rule. 
This model represents three distinct outcomes that are possible in the Japanese pork 
import market. Case 1 is when the SG trigger is not binding; that is, QT ≥ QM. In this case 
SG is never triggered (i.e., Θ = 0) and the market determines the equilibrium import level 
(QM) given the standard import price specified in Japan's GATT commitment. Case 2 is 
the more interesting case when the SG trigger is binding (i.e., QT ≤ QM), and the gate 
price is raised when QT is exceeded (i.e., Θ = λ). The outcome is a reduction in the level 
of pork import to a certain level QS. Since the SG trigger QT is set by GATT rules 
independent of the underlying domestic supply and demand structure that generates 
realizations of the import level under SG (i.e., QS), there is no a priori relationship 
between the two. However, case 2 becomes interesting to foreign suppliers only when QS 
≤ QT. Otherwise, when QT ≤ QS ≤ QM the SG is always triggered, which is case 3. The 
condition for case 2 to hold can be expressed by the relationship of some underlying 
parameters, i.e.,  
λ
ε
τ ≤
ed
, (2) 
where τ is the distance in percent between QM to QT, which largely depends on how fast 
current consumption grows and production declines relative to the average of the last 
three years, λ is the allowable increase in the gate price, and εed is the excess demand 
elasticity. Excess demand is defined as )()( •−•= SDED , with elasticity of the form, 
ssddsed ww εεε −= , (3) 
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where εd is demand elasticity of [1a], εs is supply elasticity of [1b], and w is the ratio of 
supply and demand to excess demand, respectively. 
Substituting specific values in [2], that is, λ = 24 percent, εed = -1.773 (in Table 3), 
and QT = 1.19 QMt-i, then case 2 requires that the growth rate of pork imports is in the 
range of 1.19 to 2.07 percent. Any growth rate in pork imports below the lower limit will 
not cause the trigger to be exceeded, while any growth rate above the upper limit will 
always exceed the trigger. There is no incentive collude under both scenarios. 
In a policy regime with quantity trigger and specific duty, the appropriate measure of 
suppliers’ welfare is net profit. The percentage change in net profit with the SG invoked 
is 
αε
λε
π w
s
ed
=∆ , (4) 
where εsw is the supply elasticity of the foreign suppliers in [1c] and α is the proportion of 
net profit to total revenue. The sign of [4] depends on the sign of the parameters only and 
not on their relative magnitudes. Since λ, α, and εsw are non-negative, the sign of [4] is 
always non-positive because εed is always non-positive. This suggests that foreign 
suppliers are always worse off when SG is invoked. Hence, an incentive to collude among 
suppliers to avoid triggering the SG always exists. With an essentially variable levy 
import protection regime, the relevant price faced by foreign pork suppliers is determined 
by their respective marginal cost given the import quantity demanded. As smaller 
quantities of pork are demanded under an SG, total revenue (and net revenue, too) of 
foreign pork suppliers declines because both quantity and prices are lower.  
The strength of the incentive, however, depends primarily on the relative magnitudes 
of the parameters. That is, on the demand side, the more elastic (inelastic) the excess 
demand function the stronger (weaker) the incentive to collude. The reason is that with a 
rise in the gate price by λ when the trigger is exceeded, there is a bigger reduction in the 
quantity of pork import demanded when demand is more elastic. On the supply side, the 
more inelastic (elastic) the supply function of foreign suppliers the stronger (weaker) is 
the incentive to collude. The reason is that for a given drop in the quantity of pork import 
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demanded there is a larger decline in the effective price faced by foreign suppliers when 
their supply function is more inelastic. 
We use a multi-plant monopolist structure to derive workable and efficient rules of 
allocating market share under a collusion scenario. Under this scenario, aggregate output 
is constrained in the neighborhood of the SG trigger (i.e., QC = QT - ε, where ε → 0). The 
rule for efficient allocation is to equalize marginal cost across all foreign sources of pork 
supply. At the aggregate level, the marginal cost is determined by substituting the SG 
trigger quantity in the aggregate marginal cost function (i.e., C’(QC), a horizontal 
aggregation of the individual marginal cost functions of all suppliers). Then the output of 
the individual supplier is determined by substituting the marginal cost at the trigger 
quantity to the respective supply functions,  
)(
1' C
i
C
i MCcq
−
=
 ∀ i, j = 1, …, n, and Cn
i
C
i Qq =∑
=1
. (5) 
This allocation favors suppliers with lower marginal cost. However, it is likely that the 
allocation of QC based on [5] may not be acceptable to existing suppliers. A compromise 
may be made to retain output level in the previous year and allocate only the additional 
output based on [5]; i.e., 
)( 11,, −− −+= t
T
T
T
i
titi QQQ
qqq . (6) 
However, the workable rule given in [6] does not guarantee the most efficient 
allocation. An additional provision is needed to improve efficiency. That is, the rule in [6] 
can be considered as simply allocating an initial export quota, and then allow free trade of 
quota rights among the foreign suppliers. With this arrangement, the initial workable 
allocation in [6] will approach a more efficient allocation in [5] at the equilibrium of the 
quota market, as quota rights are traded from high cost exporters to low cost exporters. 
Consumer and producer surplus measures are used to examine the welfare 
implications of the collusion scenario. 
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Data, Estimation, Results, and Discussion 
Data are from the Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation’s (ALIC’s) 
Monthly Statistics, and data provided directly from their North American Representative 
Office for November 1992 to August 1998. All estimations used Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) and were conducted in SAS, release 6.12. 
 
Impact of the Safeguard 
The first SG was invoked from November 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996. The second 
SG was invoked on July 1, 1996 until March 31, 1997 (see Table 2 for trigger quantities). 
Moreover, because the SSG was triggered on January 1, 1997, the second SG was 
extended until June 30, 1997. The safeguard was not invoked for the remainder of 1997 
partly due to limited pork availability in the world with the FMD in Taiwan and classical 
swine fever (CSF) in the European Union (EU). In 1998, the SG trigger was again not 
exceeded due to the macroeconomic crisis in Asia including Japan. However, with low 
imports in 1997 and 1998, and the continuing decline in domestic pork production, it is 
very likely that when Japan’s economy recovers, its import level may again exceed the 
SG trigger. 
The impact of a safeguard can be gleaned from the outcomes of the 1995 and 1996 
SG. Firstly, it increased both the level and volatility of retail price. The reported range of 
price transmission elasticity between the gate price and retail price is from 0.71 to 1.42. 
This study estimates a transmission elasticity between wholesale and retail price, in real 
terms, at 0.55. With the 24 percent rise in the gate price under the SG (i.e., 140 y/kg), 
retail price increased in the expected range of 17 to 34 percent (i.e., 150 to 200 y/kg). 
Also, due to speculative purchases and stockholding, the SG and SSG have created price 
variability that is much higher than normal in non-SG periods. Figure 2 shows that 
changes in retail pork prices were bigger immediately prior to and after an SG was 
invoked.1 Secondly, the higher gate price raised the CIF of imported pork. Since the gate 
                                                          
1 There is some indication that prices seem to be more stable after an SG is invoked because of the larger 
than normal size of meat in stock. 
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price does not differentiate between fresh-chilled or frozen pork imports, the CIF of both 
types of products are similarly impacted by the gate price policy. That is, with a higher 
gate price, foreign suppliers use a product strategy to come up with a product mix that 
gives a CIF value that is in the neighborhood of the gate price (see Figure 3). In effect, 
even with the higher specific tax, the GOJ revenue may not increase proportionately, 
because the CIF also rises as the gate price is increased. In the 1995 SG, while the gate 
price increased by Y140/kg, the increase in tax revenue was only Y16/kg. In the 1996 SG, 
while the gate price increased by Y137/kg, tax revenue actually declined by Y6/kg. 
Thirdly, the SG impacted the level and timing of imports and stocks. Figure 4 seems 
to suggest that during normal periods Japan hold an inventory of pork that is equivalent to 
73 percent of its monthly pork consumption and then imports 100 percent of the deficit 
between domestic production and consumption in a given month. This pattern has 
changed radically with the SG and SSG. Both in the 1995 and 1996 SG and SSG, 
speculative purchases raised the import level to 211 to 258 percent of domestic deficit, 
while stocks increased from 119 to 240 percent of consumption. Also, timing of imports 
normally follows consumption where it is 10 percent higher in the third quarter. But with 
the SG, imports are highest in the quarter before it is likely triggered.  
 
New Supply and Demand Elasticities and Incentive to Collude 
Since the magnitude of the underlying supply and demand elasticity is an important 
determinant of the strength of the incentive to collude, we estimate a new supply and 
demand elasticity using more disaggregated and recent monthly data. On the demand 
side, [1a] is specified as an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) meat demand system, 
which includes beef, pork, and broilers. Imported beef and imported pork are treated as a 
differentiated product to generate tighter estimates. The formula in Green and Alston 
(1990, 1991) is used to estimate demand elasticities. On the supply side, [1b] is separated 
into two functions representing the number of swine slaughtered and the average 
slaughter weight. Total supply is a product of these two functions with elasticity equal to 
w
s
n
ss εεε += . 
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Demand elasticities in Table 3 show that imported beef has the highest income 
elasticity at 1.527, while imported pork has the lowest at 0.612. Strong preference by 
Japanese consumers for domestic pork over imports may explain the low expenditure 
elasticity for imported pork. The uncompensated elasticities suggest that domestic pork is 
a net complement to domestic beef (and vice versa), and imported pork is a net 
complement to imported beef (and vice versa). 
The downward trend in the estimated number of swine slaughtered reflects the 
declining swine inventory base. The responsiveness of pork supply at 0.231 is largely 
contributed by the slaughter weight elasticity at 0.161, rather than the elasticity of the 
number slaughtered, which is only 0.07. That is, since the current policy regime is more 
likely to generate temporary price movements, producers are likely to respond through 
changes in slaughter weights rather than through changes in the numbers slaughtered. 
This is due to the flexibility the former affords and the lower fixed cost it involves 
compared to the later. 
A comparison of elasticities in Table 4 indicates that the estimate using monthly data 
gives higher demand elasticity but lower supply elasticity. Since the data are released 
monthly, the responsiveness of supply may not fully capture the response through the 
inventory. When this is accounted for, supply elasticity could possibly increase but not 
any higher than 0.35. The demand elasticity, on the other hand, is more reasonable. But as 
the proportion of imported pork continues to increase relative to total consumption, this 
elasticity might approach –0.40. 
Also, Table 4 gives the pork excess demand elasticity estimates using equation [3] 
with supply and demand elasticities from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), and 
own new estimates, and the level of pork production and consumption for 1995 to 1998 
from production, supply, and distribution (PS&D). The excess demand elasticity is 
greater than one for all years in all models, with the elasticity from monthly data giving 
the largest (in absolute value) excess demand elasticity of –1.773. Using this elasticity 
and assumed values for the other parameters, Table 5 shows that the rate of net profit 
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reduction is three times larger when the SG is invoked than under the collusion scenario 
that avoids triggering the SG.  
 
Welfare Impacts of Collusion 
There are several losers when the SG and SSG are invoked. Foreign suppliers lose 
revenue. Japanese pork processors pay higher prices for imported frozen pork and higher 
storage cost, especially when they involve in speculative purchases. Consumers are worse 
off with limited availability of pork imports at a higher price. The winners are the GOJ 
with added tax revenue and domestic producers with higher prices. But an increase in 
GOJ revenue from duties may not be very significant, as shown earlier. Also, with price 
more volatile and increases not permanent, the long-run benefit to domestic producers is 
also suspect. 
The reduction in consumer surplus between the initial equilibrium 
vector ),,,( 00000 mds qqqpE  and the SG equilibrium vector ),,,(
11111
mds qqqpE  can be 
decomposed into several components, 



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[ ])).(( 1101 sd qqpp −−+ . 
The first term of the right hand side (RHS) represents the portion of the consumer 
surplus that is purely transferred to domestic producers. The remaining three terms are 
losses due to inefficiencies induced by the SG. The second term of the RHS is the 
additional deadweight loss caused by the larger wedge created by the SG between market 
price and marginal cost. The third term in the RHS represents the inefficiency caused by 
the substitution of the low-cost imports with high-cost domestic supply. Since foreign 
suppliers respond to the higher specific tax with a product mix strategy that raises their 
CIF to the neighborhood of the new higher gate price, welfare losses may not be fully 
recovered through higher tax revenue because the tax revenue may not actually increase 
proportionately. That is, the inefficiency—caused as foreign suppliers substitute a 
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low-cost products mix with high-cost product mix imports to avoid paying the higher 
specific tax—may approach the last term.2 Moreover, the losses from higher production 
cost of domestic supply may actually be higher and the surplus appropriated by producers 
may actually be smaller when the higher cost of storage is accounted for, causing the 
domestic supply function to move to the left (shift or rotate). 
Clearly, since consumer surplus is lost from inefficiencies induced by the SG, 
collusion among foreign suppliers to avoid triggering the SG is welfare-improving. Also, 
since each component in the RHS is non-trivial, it is likely that welfare losses of 
consumers and foreign suppliers are more than enough to compensate domestic producers 
to favor the collusion scenario.3 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
Under the present pork import policy regime in Japan, there is an incentive for 
foreign suppliers to collude to avoid exceeding the SG trigger. This paper determined that 
the range of growth in the quantity of pork imports demanded to be in the range of 1.19 to 
2.07 percent for this incentive to exist. The strength of this incentive depends on the 
magnitude of the underlying supply, demand, and policy parameters. Measured by the net 
profit of suppliers, the more inelastic (elastic) the supply function the stronger (weaker) 
the incentive, and the more elastic (inelastic) the excess demand function the stronger 
(weaker) the incentive to collude. 
Rules for sharing out the market under the collusion scenario use a multi-plant 
monopolist structure to determine a workable initial distribution of export quota rights, 
and include provision for trade of export quota rights to allow low-cost suppliers to 
increase their share in order to improve efficiency. 
                                                          
2 There might be quality issues involved in the change in product mix strategy by foreign suppliers that 
complicate the assessment of welfare impacts. 
3 This collusion behavior is not similar to a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER). Whereas, exporting 
countries appropriate the higher rent under the VER, with a variable levy-like import protection in the 
present case, domestic consumers pay a higher price while foreign suppliers face a lower price even with 
collusion.  
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It can be shown that this collusion is welfare-improving since the SG induces 
inefficiencies from larger deadweight loss, substituting low-cost imports for high-cost 
domestic supply, and substituting low-cost product mix imports for a high-cost product 
mix. Moreover, welfare losses of consumers and foreign suppliers are more than enough 
to compensate domestic producers and the GOJ to favor the collusion scenario.  
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Table 1. Specific tax, ad valorem tax, gate price, and standard import price of pork, 
Japan, 1995 to 2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Specific Tax       
   Carcass 414 404 393 383 372 361 
   Boneless Cuts 553 539 524 510 496 482 
Ad Valorem Tax 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 
Gate Price       
   Carcass 439 429 420 411 402 393 
   Boneless Cuts 585 572 560 548 536 524 
Standard Import Price       
   Carcass 460 450 440 429 419 409 
   Boneless Cuts 613 600 586 573 559 547 
Source: ALIC North American Representative Office. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Pork safeguard trigger level for 1995 to 1998 
Quarter 1995 1996 1997 1998 
   First 146,965 152,488 253,767 241,491 
   Second 286,215 311736 406,462 437,977 
   Third 440,494 482,268 573,390 602,519 
   Fourth 565,000 594,000 674,751 692,373 
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Table 3. Uncompensated, compensated, and expenditure elasticity estimates 
 Domestic 
Beef 
Imported 
Beef 
Domestic 
Pork 
Imported 
Pork 
 
Broilers 
Expen- 
diture 
Domestic 
Beef 
-1.108 
-0.849 
0.178 
0.359 
-0.838 
-0.623 
0.319 
0.420 
0.423 
0.693 
1.027 
Imported 
Beef 
0.173 
0.559 
-0.886 
-0.617 
0.686 
1.006 
-0.881 
-0.730 
-0.620 
-0.218 
1.527 
Domestic 
Pork 
-1.027 
-0.750 
0.551 
0.744 
-0.752 
-0.522 
0.031 
0.140 
0.100 
0.389 
1.098 
Imported 
Pork 
0.893 
1.048 
-1.326 
-1.218 
0.098 
0.226 
-0.312 
-0.251 
0.035 
0.196 
0.612 
Broilers 0.471 
0.644 
-0.188 
-0.067 
0.111 
0.255 
0.001 
0.069 
-1.083 
-0.902 
0.689 
Note: First entry in a cell is Marshallian elasticity and the second entry is Hicksian 
elasticity. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Excess demand elasticity estimates 
   1995 1996 1997 1998 Average 
 Supply 1322 1266 1283 1290 1290 
 
Levels 
(000 mt) Demand 2063 2119 2081 2080 2086 
 Elasticity 
Models Supply Demand Excess Demand 
   OECD 0.440 -0.300 -1.620 -1.398 -1.490 -1.508 -1.504 
   FAPRI 0.520 -0.310 -1.791 -1.542 -1.644 -1.665 -1.661 
   Own 0.231 -0.532 -1.893 -1.664 -1.758 -1.777 -1.773 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Comparison of net profit change (in percent) under SG and collusion 
scenario 
 α = 30 percent 
Scenario εsw =  4•εed εsw =  3•εed εsw =  2•εed 
   Safeguard Invoked -30 -40 -60 
   Collusion (No SG) -10 -13 -19 
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  Figure 1. Relationship of the standard import price and CIF. 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 2. Retail price changes for domestic and imported pork. 
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 Figure 3. Gate price, standard import price, and CIF. 
 
 
 
 Figure 4. Proportion of stock-consumption and import-domestic deficit. 
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